Показать полную графическую версию : вопросы безопасности
Belansky
наверное, надо во FreeBSD.org все это отписать
Belansky
30-08-2004, 10:18
Хотя, посмотрел на других фтпишниках, например, ftp.relcom.ru, каталог /etc/ также виден. Может, ничего страшного в этом и нет.
Belansky
вообще-то /etc на ftp раньше бывали видны всегда. Файл паролей там бывал без реальных паролей и без реальных пользователей, так что показ его ничему не грозил :) Вопрос в другом - насколько я поняла, там что-то странное творилось? (хотя, может быть просто переконфигуряли на глазах изумленной публики).
Belansky
01-09-2004, 12:03
Два дня, как все встало на места. Видимо, и впрямь что-то конфигурили на ходу.
FreeBSD-SA-04:16: fetch - Overflow error in fetch (переполнение буфера в fetch) (http://www.securitylab.ru/49569.html) - сообщение от 19.11.04 (со ссылкой на http://www.freebsd.org/security/ )
- уязвимы: все версии FreeBSD
- Исправлено:
2004-11-18 12:02:13 UTC (RELENG_5, 5.3-STABLE)
2004-11-18 12:03:05 UTC (RELENG_5_3, 5.3-RELEASE-p1)
2004-11-18 12:04:29 UTC (RELENG_5_2, 5.2.1-RELEASE-p12)
2004-11-18 12:05:36 UTC (RELENG_5_1, 5.1-RELEASE-p18)
2004-11-18 12:05:50 UTC (RELENG_5_0, 5.0-RELEASE-p22)
2004-11-18 12:02:29 UTC (RELENG_4, 4.10-STABLE)
2004-11-18 12:06:06 UTC (RELENG_4_10, 4.10-RELEASE-p4)
2004-11-18 12:06:22 UTC (RELENG_4_9, 4.9-RELEASE-p13)
2004-11-18 12:06:36 UTC (RELENG_4_8, 4.8-RELEASE-p26)
2004-11-18 12:06:52 UTC (RELENG_4_7, 4.7-RELEASE-p28)
Что делать:
Либо:
1) Обновить систему до 4-STABLE, или 5-STABLE, или RELENG_5_3, RELENG_5_2, RELENG_4_10, RELENG_4_8 (на дату после указанной выше)
Либо:
2) "пропатчить" систему (FreeBSD 4.8, 4.10, 5.2, 5.3):
a) Скачайте соответствующий patch по прилагаемой ссылке и сверьте PGP - подпись при помощи утилиты PGP.
# ftp ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-04:16/fetch.patch
# ftp ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-04:16/fetch.patch.asc
b) Выполните (от root ) следующие команды:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
# cd /usr/src/usr.bin/fetch
# make obj && make depend && make && make install
Детали исправлений (что, где, когда)
Branch Revision Path
RELENG_4
src/usr.bin/fetch/fetch.c 1.10.2.28
RELENG_4_10
src/UPDATING 1.73.2.90.2.5
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.44.2.34.2.6
src/usr.bin/fetch/fetch.c 1.10.2.23.2.1
RELENG_4_9
src/UPDATING 1.73.2.89.2.14
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.44.2.32.2.14
src/usr.bin/fetch/fetch.c 1.10.2.21.2.1
RELENG_4_8
src/UPDATING 1.73.2.80.2.29
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.44.2.29.2.27
src/usr.bin/fetch/fetch.c 1.10.2.20.2.1
RELENG_4_7
src/UPDATING 1.73.2.74.2.32
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.44.2.26.2.30
src/usr.bin/fetch/fetch.c 1.10.2.18.2.1
RELENG_5
src/usr.bin/fetch/fetch.c 1.72.2.2
RELENG_5_3
src/UPDATING 1.342.2.13.2.4
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.62.2.15.2.6
src/usr.bin/fetch/fetch.c 1.72.2.1.2.1
RELENG_5_2
src/UPDATING 1.282.2.20
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.56.2.19
src/usr.bin/fetch/fetch.c 1.62.4.1
RELENG_5_1
src/UPDATING 1.251.2.20
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.50.2.20
src/usr.bin/fetch/fetch.c 1.62.2.1
RELENG_5_0
src/UPDATING 1.229.2.28
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.48.2.23
src/usr.bin/fetch/fetch.c 1.58.2.1
Belansky
02-12-2004, 19:41
Новое обновление по безопасности для всех версий FreeBSD
ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-04:17.procfs.asc
...есть подозрение, что на одной машине стоит backdoor... как узнать, какой именно процесс "ломится" через ppp в инет?
Demiurg
Может следует использовать sockstat
и посмотреть что за процессы конектятся
в сеть.
У тебя ppp -auto ...?
Просто был у меня случай. Вначале dns
сервер посылал udp пакеты. Потом
после еще оказалось что само ядро
тоже шлет пакет на multycast адрес (непомню какой, но это был не backdoor)
Вобщем если sockstat непоможет
рекомендую просмотреть спомошью tcpdump.
Belansky
31-03-2005, 23:13
Очередной патч (ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-05:01.telnet.asc) по безопасности закрывающий брешь в клиенте telnet, способную привести к ошибке переполнения буфера.
Belansky
07-04-2005, 18:11
Два патча по безопасности. ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-05:02.sendfile.asc и ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-05:03.amd64.asc
Belansky
17-04-2005, 08:45
И снова патч (ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-05:04.ifconf.asc) по безопасности. При генерации списка сетевых интерфейсов ядро пишет в часть буфера, не обнуляя ее. В результате предыдущее содержимое буфера может быть доступно процессу. Процесс пользователя может получить доступ к 12 байтам данных. Эта память может содержать такую информацию, как части кэша файла или буфера терминала (например, в буфере терминала может находится пароль пользователя).
Belansky
25-04-2005, 10:54
Очередной патч (ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-05:05.cvs.asc) по безопасности.
[1] FreeBSD-SA-05:08.kmem (ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-05:08.kmem.asc)
[2] FreeBSD-SA-05:07.ldt (ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-05:07.ldt.asc)
[3] FreeBSD-SA-05:06.iir (ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-05:06.iir.asc)
Belansky
14-05-2005, 08:50
Очередной патч (ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-05:09.htt.asc) по безопасности.
Из freebsd-security-notifications@freebsd.org
=============================================================================
Message: 1
FreeBSD-SA-05:10.tcpdump Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: Infinite loops in tcpdump protocol decoding
Category: contrib
Module: tcpdump
Announced: 2005-06-09
Credits: "Vade 79", Simon L. Nielsen
Affects: FreeBSD 5.3-RELEASE and FreeBSD 5.4-RELEASE
Corrected: 2005-06-08 21:26:27 UTC (RELENG_5, 5.4-STABLE)
2005-06-08 21:27:44 UTC (RELENG_5_4, 5.4-RELEASE-p2)
2005-06-08 21:29:15 UTC (RELENG_5_3, 5.3-RELEASE-p16)
CVE Name: CAN-2005-1267, CAN-2005-1278, CAN-2005-1279, CAN-2005-1280
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit
<URL:http://www.freebsd.org/security/>.
I. Background
The tcpdump utility is used to capture and examine network traffic.
II. Problem Description
Several tcpdump protocol decoders contain programming errors which can
cause them to go into infinite loops.
III. Impact
An attacker can inject specially crafted packets into the network
which, when processed by tcpdump, could lead to a denial-of-service.
After the attack, tcpdump would no longer capture traffic, and would
potentially use all available processor time.
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 5-STABLE, or to the RELENG_5_4
or RELENG_5_3 security branch dated after the correction date.
2) To patch your present system:
The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD 5.3 and
5.4 systems.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-05:10/tcpdump.patch
# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-05:10/tcpdump.patch.asc
b) Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
# cd /usr/src/usr.sbin/tcpdump/tcpdump
# make obj && make depend && make && make install
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
corrected in FreeBSD.
Branch Revision
Path
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
RELENG_5
src/contrib/tcpdump/print-bgp.c 1.1.1.5.2.1
src/contrib/tcpdump/print-isoclns.c 1.12.2.1
src/contrib/tcpdump/print-ldp.c 1.1.1.1.2.1
src/contrib/tcpdump/print-rsvp.c 1.1.1.1.2.1
RELENG_5_4
src/UPDATING 1.342.2.24.2.11
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.62.2.18.2.7
src/contrib/tcpdump/print-bgp.c 1.1.1.5.6.1
src/contrib/tcpdump/print-isoclns.c 1.12.6.1
src/contrib/tcpdump/print-ldp.c 1.1.1.1.6.1
src/contrib/tcpdump/print-rsvp.c 1.1.1.1.6.1
RELENG_5_3
src/UPDATING 1.342.2.13.2.19
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.62.2.15.2.21
src/contrib/tcpdump/print-bgp.c 1.1.1.5.4.1
src/contrib/tcpdump/print-isoclns.c 1.12.4.1
src/contrib/tcpdump/print-ldp.c 1.1.1.1.4.1
src/contrib/tcpdump/print-rsvp.c 1.1.1.1.4.1
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. References
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-1267
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-1278
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-1279
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-1280
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=bugtraq&m=111454406222040
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=bugtraq&m=111454461300644
=============================================================================
Message: 2
FreeBSD-SA-05:11.gzip Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: gzip directory traversal and permission race vulnerabilities
Category: contrib
Module: gzip
Announced: 2005-06-09
Credits: Ulf Harnhammar, Imran Ghory
Affects: All FreeBSD releases
Corrected: 2005-06-08 21:26:27 UTC (RELENG_5, 5.4-STABLE)
2005-06-08 21:27:44 UTC (RELENG_5_4, 5.4-RELEASE-p2)
2005-06-08 21:29:15 UTC (RELENG_5_3, 5.3-RELEASE-p16)
2005-06-08 21:29:53 UTC (RELENG_4, 4.11-STABLE)
2005-06-08 21:30:43 UTC (RELENG_4_11, 4.11-RELEASE-p10)
2005-06-08 21:31:16 UTC (RELENG_4_10, 4.10-RELEASE-p15)
CVE Name: CAN-2005-0988, CAN-2005-1228
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit
<URL:http://www.freebsd.org/security/>.
I. Background
gzip is a file compression utility.
II. Problem Description
Two problems related to extraction of files exist in gzip:
The first problem is that gzip does not properly sanitize filenames
containing "/" when uncompressing files using the -N command line
option.
The second problem is that gzip does not set permissions on newly
extracted files until after the file has been created and the file
descriptor has been closed.
III. Impact
The first problem can allow an attacker to overwrite arbitrary local
files when uncompressing a file using the -N command line option.
The second problem can allow a local attacker to change the
permissions of arbitrary local files, on the same partition as the one
the user is uncompressing a file on, by removing the file the user is
uncompressing and replacing it with a hardlink before the uncompress
operation is finished.
IV. Workaround
Do not use the -N command line option on untrusted files and do not
uncompress files in directories where untrusted users have write
access.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 4-STABLE or 5-STABLE, or to the
RELENG_5_4, RELENG_5_3, RELENG_4_11, or RELENG_4_10 security branch
dated after the correction date.
2) To patch your present system:
The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD 4.10,
4.11, 5.3, and 5.4 systems.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-05:11/gzip.patch
# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-05:11/gzip.patch.asc
b) Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
# cd /usr/src/gnu/usr.bin/gzip
# make obj && make depend && make && make install
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
corrected in FreeBSD.
Branch Revision
Path
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
RELENG_4
src/gnu/usr.bin/gzip/gzip.c 1.10.2.1
RELENG_4_11
src/UPDATING 1.73.2.91.2.11
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.44.2.39.2.14
src/gnu/usr.bin/gzip/gzip.c 1.10.26.1
RELENG_4_10
src/UPDATING 1.73.2.90.2.16
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.44.2.34.2.17
src/gnu/usr.bin/gzip/gzip.c 1.10.24.1
RELENG_5
src/gnu/usr.bin/gzip/gzip.c 1.11.2.1
RELENG_5_4
src/UPDATING 1.342.2.24.2.11
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.62.2.18.2.7
src/gnu/usr.bin/gzip/gzip.c 1.11.6.1
RELENG_5_3
src/UPDATING 1.342.2.13.2.19
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.62.2.15.2.21
src/gnu/usr.bin/gzip/gzip.c 1.11.4.1
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. References
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-0988
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-1228
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=bugtraq&m=111271860708210
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=bugtraq&m=111402732406477
Продолжение (опять bind)
=============================================================================
Message: 3
FreeBSD-SA-05:12.bind9 Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: BIND 9 DNSSEC remote denial of service vulnerability
Category: core
Module: bind9
Announced: 2005-06-09
Credits: Internet Systems Consortium
Affects: FreeBSD 5.3
Corrected: 2005-03-23 18:16:29 UTC (RELENG_5, 5.3-STABLE)
2005-06-08 21:29:15 UTC (RELENG_5_3, 5.3-RELEASE-p16)
CVE Name: CAN-2005-0034
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit
<URL:http://www.freebsd.org/security/>.
I. Background
BIND 9 is an implementation of the Domain Name System (DNS) protocols.
The named(8) daemon is the Internet domain name server. DNS Security
Extensions (DNSSEC) are additional protocol options that add
authentication and integrity to the DNS protocols.
DNSSEC is not enabled by default in any FreeBSD release. A system
administrator must take special action to enable DNSSEC.
II. Problem Description
A DNSSEC-related validator function in BIND 9.3.0 contains an
inappropriate internal consistency test. When this test is triggered,
named(8) will exit.
III. Impact
On systems with DNSSEC enabled, a remote attacker may be able to inject
a specially crafted packet that will cause the internal consistency test
to trigger, and named(8) to terminate. As a result, the name server
will no longer be available to service requests.
IV. Workaround
DNSSEC is not enabled by default, and the "dnssec-enable" directive is
not normally present. If DNSSEC has been enabled, disable it by
changing the "dnssec-enable" directive to "dnssec-enable no;" in the
named.conf(5) configuration file.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 5-STABLE, or to the RELENG_5_3
security branch dated after the correction date.
2) To patch your present system:
The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD 5.3
systems.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-05:12/bind9.patch
# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-05:12/bind9.patch.asc
b) Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src/
# patch < /path/to/patch
# cd /usr/src/lib/bind
# make obj && make depend && make && make install
# cd /usr/src/usr.sbin/named
# make obj && make depend && make && make install
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
corrected in FreeBSD.
Branch Revision
Path
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
RELENG_5
src/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/validator.c 1.1.1.1.2.2
RELENG_5_3
src/UPDATING 1.342.2.13.2.19
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.62.2.15.2.21
src/contrib/bind9/lib/dns/validator.c 1.1.1.1.2.1.2.1
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. References
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-0034
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/938617
http://www.isc.org/index.pl?/sw/bind/bind-security.php
http://www.isc.org/index.pl?/sw/bind/bind9.php
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Message: 1
Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2005 21:54:54 GMT
From: FreeBSD Security Advisories <security-advisories@freebsd.org>
Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-05:13.ipfw
To: FreeBSD Security Advisories <security-advisories@freebsd.org>
Message-ID: <200506292154.j5TLssOf008150@freefall.freebsd.org>
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-05:13.ipfw Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: ipfw packet matching errors with address tables
Category: core
Module: netinet
Announced: 2005-06-29
Credits: Max Laier
Affects: FreeBSD 5.4-RELEASE
Corrected: 2005-06-29 21:38:48 UTC (RELENG_5, 5.4-STABLE)
2005-06-29 21:41:03 UTC (RELENG_5_4, 5.4-RELEASE-p3)
CVE Name: CAN-2005-2019
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit
<URL:http://www.freebsd.org/security/>.
I. Background
ipfw(8) is a system facility which allows IP packet filtering,
redirecting, and traffic accounting. ipfw lookup tables are a way to
specify many IP addresses which can be used for packet matching in an
efficient manner.
II. Problem Description
The ipfw tables lookup code caches the result of the last query. The
kernel may process multiple packets concurrently, performing several
concurrent table lookups. Due to an insufficient locking, a cached
result can become corrupted that could cause some addresses to be
incorrectly matched against a lookup table.
III. Impact
When lookup tables are used with ipfw, packets may on very rare
occasions incorrectly match a lookup table. This could result in a
packet being treated contrary to the defined packet filtering ruleset.
For example, a packet may be allowed to pass through when it should
have been discarded.
The problem can only occur on Symmetric Multi-Processor (SMP) systems,
or on Uni Processor (UP) systems with the PREEMPTION kernel option
enabled (not the default).
IV. Workaround
a) Do not use lookup tables.
OR
b) Disable concurrent processing of packets in the network stack by
setting the "debug.mpsafenet=0" tunable:
# echo "debug.mpsafenet=0" >> /boot/loader.conf
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 5-STABLE, or to the RELENG_5_4
security branch dated after the correction date.
2) To patch your present system:
The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD 5.4
systems.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-05:13/ipfw.patch
# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-05:13/ipfw.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch.
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
<URL:http://www.freebsd.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
corrected in FreeBSD.
Branch Revision
Path
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
RELENG_5
src/sys/netinet/ip_fw2.c 1.70.2.14
RELENG_5_4
src/UPDATING 1.342.2.24.2.12
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.62.2.18.2.8
src/sys/netinet/ip_fw2.c 1.70.2.10.2.1
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. References
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-2019
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-05:13.ipfw.asc
essage: 2
Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2005 21:55:00 GMT
From: FreeBSD Security Advisories <security-advisories@freebsd.org>
Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-05:14.bzip2
To: FreeBSD Security Advisories <security-advisories@freebsd.org>
Message-ID: <200506292155.j5TLt0cj008194@freefall.freebsd.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-05:14.bzip2 Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: bzip2 denial of service and permission race vulnerabilities
Category: contrib
Module: contrib_bzip2
Announced: 2005-06-29
Credits: Imran Ghory, Chris Evans
Affects: All FreeBSD releases
Corrected: 2005-06-29 21:38:48 UTC (RELENG_5, 5.4-STABLE)
2005-06-29 21:41:03 UTC (RELENG_5_4, 5.4-RELEASE-p3)
2005-06-29 21:42:33 UTC (RELENG_5_3, 5.3-RELEASE-p17)
2005-06-29 21:43:42 UTC (RELENG_4, 4.11-STABLE)
2005-06-29 21:45:14 UTC (RELENG_4_11, 4.11-RELEASE-p11)
2005-06-29 21:46:15 UTC (RELENG_4_10, 4.10-RELEASE-p16)
CVE Name: CAN-2005-0953, CAN-2005-1260
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit
<URL:http://www.freebsd.org/security/>.
I. Background
bzip2 is a block-sorting file compression utility.
II. Problem Description
Two problems have been discovered relating to the extraction of
bzip2-compressed files. First, a carefully constructed invalid bzip2
archive can cause bzip2 to enter an infinite loop. Second, when
creating a new file, bzip2 closes the file before setting its
permissions.
III. Impact
The first problem can cause bzip2 to extract a bzip2 archive to an
infinitely large file. If bzip2 is used in automated processing of
untrusted files this could be exploited by an attacker to create an
denial-of-service situation by exhausting disk space or by consuming
all available cpu time.
The second problem can allow a local attacker to change the
permissions of local files owned by the user executing bzip2 providing
that they have write access to the directory in which the file is
being extracted.
IV. Workaround
Do not uncompress bzip2 archives from untrusted sources and do not
uncompress files in directories where untrusted users have write
access.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 4-STABLE or 5-STABLE, or to the
RELENG_5_4, RELENG_5_3, RELENG_4_11, or RELENG_4_10 security branch
dated after the correction date.
2) To patch your present system:
The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD 4.10,
4.11, 5.3, and 5.4 systems.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-05:14/bzip2.patch
# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-05:14/bzip2.patch.asc
b) Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
# cd /usr/src/lib/libbz2
# make obj && make depend && make && make install
# cd /usr/src/usr.bin/bzip2
# make obj && make depend && make && make install
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
corrected in FreeBSD.
Branch Revision
Path
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
RELENG_4
contrib/bzip2/bzip2.c 1.1.1.1.2.3
contrib/bzip2/bzlib.c 1.1.1.1.2.3
contrib/bzip2/compress.c 1.1.1.1.2.3
contrib/bzip2/decompress.c 1.1.1.1.2.3
contrib/bzip2/huffman.c 1.1.1.1.2.3
RELENG_4_11
src/UPDATING 1.73.2.91.2.12
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.44.2.39.2.15
contrib/bzip2/bzip2.c 1.1.1.1.2.2.12.1
contrib/bzip2/bzlib.c 1.1.1.1.2.2.12.1
contrib/bzip2/compress.c 1.1.1.1.2.2.12.1
contrib/bzip2/decompress.c 1.1.1.1.2.2.12.1
contrib/bzip2/huffman.c 1.1.1.1.2.2.12.1
RELENG_4_10
src/UPDATING 1.73.2.90.2.17
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.44.2.34.2.18
contrib/bzip2/bzip2.c 1.1.1.1.2.2.10.1
contrib/bzip2/bzlib.c 1.1.1.1.2.2.10.1
contrib/bzip2/compress.c 1.1.1.1.2.2.10.1
contrib/bzip2/decompress.c 1.1.1.1.2.2.10.1
contrib/bzip2/huffman.c 1.1.1.1.2.2.10.1
RELENG_5
contrib/bzip2/bzip2.c 1.1.1.2.8.1
contrib/bzip2/bzlib.c 1.1.1.2.8.1
contrib/bzip2/compress.c 1.1.1.2.8.1
contrib/bzip2/decompress.c 1.1.1.2.8.1
contrib/bzip2/huffman.c 1.1.1.2.8.1
RELENG_5_4
src/UPDATING 1.342.2.24.2.12
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.62.2.18.2.8
contrib/bzip2/bzip2.c 1.1.1.2.12.1
contrib/bzip2/bzlib.c 1.1.1.2.12.1
contrib/bzip2/compress.c 1.1.1.2.12.1
contrib/bzip2/decompress.c 1.1.1.2.12.1
contrib/bzip2/huffman.c 1.1.1.2.12.1
RELENG_5_3
src/UPDATING 1.342.2.13.2.20
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.62.2.15.2.22
contrib/bzip2/bzip2.c 1.1.1.2.10.1
contrib/bzip2/bzlib.c 1.1.1.2.10.1
contrib/bzip2/compress.c 1.1.1.2.10.1
contrib/bzip2/decompress.c 1.1.1.2.10.1
contrib/bzip2/huffman.c 1.1.1.2.10.1
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. References
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-0953
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-1260
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=bugtraq&m=111229375217633
http://scary.beasts.org/security/CESA-2005-002.txt
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-05:14.bzip.asc
: 2
Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2005 21:55:00 GMT
From: FreeBSD Security Advisories <security-advisories@freebsd.org>
Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-05:14.bzip2
To: FreeBSD Security Advisories <security-advisories@freebsd.org>
Message-ID: <200506292155.j5TLt0cj008194@freefall.freebsd.org>
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-05:14.bzip2 Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: bzip2 denial of service and permission race vulnerabilities
Category: contrib
Module: contrib_bzip2
Announced: 2005-06-29
Credits: Imran Ghory, Chris Evans
Affects: All FreeBSD releases
Corrected: 2005-06-29 21:38:48 UTC (RELENG_5, 5.4-STABLE)
2005-06-29 21:41:03 UTC (RELENG_5_4, 5.4-RELEASE-p3)
2005-06-29 21:42:33 UTC (RELENG_5_3, 5.3-RELEASE-p17)
2005-06-29 21:43:42 UTC (RELENG_4, 4.11-STABLE)
2005-06-29 21:45:14 UTC (RELENG_4_11, 4.11-RELEASE-p11)
2005-06-29 21:46:15 UTC (RELENG_4_10, 4.10-RELEASE-p16)
CVE Name: CAN-2005-0953, CAN-2005-1260
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit
<URL:http://www.freebsd.org/security/>.
I. Background
bzip2 is a block-sorting file compression utility.
II. Problem Description
Two problems have been discovered relating to the extraction of
bzip2-compressed files. First, a carefully constructed invalid bzip2
archive can cause bzip2 to enter an infinite loop. Second, when
creating a new file, bzip2 closes the file before setting its
permissions.
III. Impact
The first problem can cause bzip2 to extract a bzip2 archive to an
infinitely large file. If bzip2 is used in automated processing of
untrusted files this could be exploited by an attacker to create an
denial-of-service situation by exhausting disk space or by consuming
all available cpu time.
The second problem can allow a local attacker to change the
permissions of local files owned by the user executing bzip2 providing
that they have write access to the directory in which the file is
being extracted.
IV. Workaround
Do not uncompress bzip2 archives from untrusted sources and do not
uncompress files in directories where untrusted users have write
access.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 4-STABLE or 5-STABLE, or to the
RELENG_5_4, RELENG_5_3, RELENG_4_11, or RELENG_4_10 security branch
dated after the correction date.
2) To patch your present system:
The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD 4.10,
4.11, 5.3, and 5.4 systems.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-05:14/bzip2.patch
# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-05:14/bzip2.patch.asc
b) Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
# cd /usr/src/lib/libbz2
# make obj && make depend && make && make install
# cd /usr/src/usr.bin/bzip2
# make obj && make depend && make && make install
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
corrected in FreeBSD.
Branch Revision
Path
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
RELENG_4
contrib/bzip2/bzip2.c 1.1.1.1.2.3
contrib/bzip2/bzlib.c 1.1.1.1.2.3
contrib/bzip2/compress.c 1.1.1.1.2.3
contrib/bzip2/decompress.c 1.1.1.1.2.3
contrib/bzip2/huffman.c 1.1.1.1.2.3
RELENG_4_11
src/UPDATING 1.73.2.91.2.12
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.44.2.39.2.15
contrib/bzip2/bzip2.c 1.1.1.1.2.2.12.1
contrib/bzip2/bzlib.c 1.1.1.1.2.2.12.1
contrib/bzip2/compress.c 1.1.1.1.2.2.12.1
contrib/bzip2/decompress.c 1.1.1.1.2.2.12.1
contrib/bzip2/huffman.c 1.1.1.1.2.2.12.1
RELENG_4_10
src/UPDATING 1.73.2.90.2.17
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.44.2.34.2.18
contrib/bzip2/bzip2.c 1.1.1.1.2.2.10.1
contrib/bzip2/bzlib.c 1.1.1.1.2.2.10.1
contrib/bzip2/compress.c 1.1.1.1.2.2.10.1
contrib/bzip2/decompress.c 1.1.1.1.2.2.10.1
contrib/bzip2/huffman.c 1.1.1.1.2.2.10.1
RELENG_5
contrib/bzip2/bzip2.c 1.1.1.2.8.1
contrib/bzip2/bzlib.c 1.1.1.2.8.1
contrib/bzip2/compress.c 1.1.1.2.8.1
contrib/bzip2/decompress.c 1.1.1.2.8.1
contrib/bzip2/huffman.c 1.1.1.2.8.1
RELENG_5_4
src/UPDATING 1.342.2.24.2.12
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.62.2.18.2.8
contrib/bzip2/bzip2.c 1.1.1.2.12.1
contrib/bzip2/bzlib.c 1.1.1.2.12.1
contrib/bzip2/compress.c 1.1.1.2.12.1
contrib/bzip2/decompress.c 1.1.1.2.12.1
contrib/bzip2/huffman.c 1.1.1.2.12.1
RELENG_5_3
src/UPDATING 1.342.2.13.2.20
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.62.2.15.2.22
contrib/bzip2/bzip2.c 1.1.1.2.10.1
contrib/bzip2/bzlib.c 1.1.1.2.10.1
contrib/bzip2/compress.c 1.1.1.2.10.1
contrib/bzip2/decompress.c 1.1.1.2.10.1
contrib/bzip2/huffman.c 1.1.1.2.10.1
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. References
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-0953
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-1260
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=bugtraq&m=111229375217633
http://scary.beasts.org/security/CESA-2005-002.txt
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-05:14.bzip.asc
Message: 3
Date: Wed, 29 Jun 2005 21:55:05 GMT
From: FreeBSD Security Advisories <security-advisories@freebsd.org>
Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-05:15.tcp
To: FreeBSD Security Advisories <security-advisories@freebsd.org>
Message-ID: <200506292155.j5TLt5ig008238@freefall.freebsd.org>
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-05:15.tcp Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: TCP connection stall denial of service
Category: core
Module: inet
Announced: 2005-06-29
Credits: Noritoshi Demizu
Affects: All FreeBSD releases.
Corrected: 2005-06-29 21:38:48 UTC (RELENG_5, 5.4-STABLE)
2005-06-29 21:41:03 UTC (RELENG_5_4, 5.4-RELEASE-p3)
2005-06-29 21:42:33 UTC (RELENG_5_3, 5.3-RELEASE-p17)
2005-06-29 21:43:42 UTC (RELENG_4, 4.11-STABLE)
2005-06-29 21:45:14 UTC (RELENG_4_11, 4.11-RELEASE-p11)
2005-06-29 21:46:15 UTC (RELENG_4_10, 4.10-RELEASE-p16)
CVE Name: CAN-2005-0356, CAN-2005-2068
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit
<URL:http://www.freebsd.org/security/>.
I. Background
The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) of the TCP/IP protocol suite
provides a connection-oriented, reliable, sequence-preserving data
stream service. TCP timestamps are used to measure Round-Trip Time
and in the Protect Against Wrapped Sequences (PAWS) algorithm. TCP
packets with the SYN flag set are used during setup of new TCP
connections.
II. Problem Description
Two problems have been discovered in the FreeBSD TCP stack.
First, when a TCP packets containing a timestamp is received, inadequate
checking of sequence numbers is performed, allowing an attacker to
artificially increase the internal "recent" timestamp for a connection.
Second, a TCP packet with the SYN flag set is accepted for established
connections, allowing an attacker to overwrite certain TCP options.
III. Impact
Using either of the two problems an attacker with knowledge of the
local and remote IP and port numbers associated with a connection
can cause a denial of service situation by stalling the TCP connection.
The stalled TCP connection my be closed after some time by the other
host.
IV. Workaround
In some cases it may be possible to defend against these attacks by
blocking the attack packets using a firewall. Packets used to effect
either of these attacks would have spoofed source IP addresses.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 4-STABLE or 5-STABLE, or to the
RELENG_5_4, RELENG_5_3, RELENG_4_11, or RELENG_4_10 security branch
dated after the correction date.
2) To patch your present system:
The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD 4.10,
4.11, 5.3, and 5.4 systems.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
[FreeBSD 4.x]
# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-05:15/tcp4.patch
# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-05:15/tcp4.patch.asc
[FreeBSD 5.x]
# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-05:15/tcp.patch
# fetch ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-05:15/tcp.patch.asc
b) Apply the patch.
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile your kernel as described in
<URL:http://www.freebsd.org/handbook/kernelconfig.html> and reboot the
system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
corrected in FreeBSD.
Branch Revision
Path
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
RELENG_4
src/sys/netinet/tcp_input.c 1.107.2.44
RELENG_4_11
src/UPDATING 1.73.2.91.2.12
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.44.2.39.2.15
src/sys/netinet/tcp_input.c 1.107.2.41.4.3
RELENG_4_10
src/UPDATING 1.73.2.90.2.17
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.44.2.34.2.18
src/sys/netinet/tcp_input.c 1.107.2.41.2.1
RELENG_5
src/sys/netinet/tcp_input.c 1.252.2.16
RELENG_5_4
src/UPDATING 1.342.2.24.2.12
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.62.2.18.2.8
src/sys/netinet/tcp_input.c 1.252.2.14.2.1
RELENG_5_3
src/UPDATING 1.342.2.13.2.20
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.62.2.15.2.22
src/sys/netinet/tcp_input.c 1.252.4.1
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. References
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-0356
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-2068
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/637934
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-05:15.tcp.asc
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